Governance Briefs
Applied analytical notes on AI governance in Uzbekistan and Central Asia. Each note operationalises a specific argument from the Beyond Control essay series through concrete regulatory and institutional cases. Published in English; Russian-language versions are also available.
Published
Analytical Note No. 1 — AI in Uzbekistan: A Question of Manageability, Not Implementation · May 2026 · English
The structural gap between Uzbekistan’s AI regulatory framework and the mechanisms needed to enforce it — and why this window is narrowing faster than in any previous sector.
Analytical Note No. 2 — The Paper Architecture · May 2026 · English
When AI governance frameworks exist but cannot be enforced. The structural gap between Uzbekistan’s regulatory output and the enforcement architecture needed to make it operational.
Analytical Note No. 3 — The Conflict of Functions · May 2026 · English
Who audits the regulator? The structural gap between coordination of AI regulatory proposals and independent oversight of deployed AI systems — and why the current architecture conflates both.
Analytical Note No. 4 — Audit Without Access · May 2026 · English
Behavioural data and the structural limits of AI oversight in Uzbekistan’s financial sector. Even an ideal independent verification body would have no defined access path to the data its work requires under the current QR payment architecture.
Analytical Note No. 5 — The Incident Gap · June 2026 · English
Why the absence of incident protocols is itself a governance failure. The deploying institution becomes, by default, the de facto arbiter of what counts as an incident — and that is not a regulatory gap. It is an architectural feature.
Analytical Note No. 6 — The Rollback Problem · June 2026 · English
AI scoring in Uzbekistan’s financial sector and the non-linear cost of correction. Most systems remain technically reversible long after they have ceased to be institutionally reversible.
Analytical Note No. 7 — The Procurement Trap · June 2026 · English
How AI procurement decisions lock in governance architecture before deployment begins. The trap is not a consequence of procurement — it is its built-in structural property.
Analytical Note No. 8 — Three Centralisation Architectures · June 2026 · English
Comparative analysis of three centralisation architectures in Uzbekistan, India (UPI), and Brazil (Pix). The subject is not payment infrastructure. It is how different governance architectures shape the consequences of the same centralising technical mechanism.
Forthcoming
Analytical Note No. 9 — Why Governance Does Not Scale
The structural limits of transposing developed-economy oversight to emerging institutional environments.
Analytical Note No. 10 — Aligned on Paper
What AI alignment means for institutions that did not build the system.
Analytical Note No. 11 — Sovereignty Without Infrastructure
Digital sovereignty as institutional claim versus operational reality.
Analytical Note No. 12 — Minimum Viable Oversight
What governance architecture can still achieve within structural limits.
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